Multiple-stage adaptive architectures are conceived to face with the problem of target detection buried in noise, clutter, and intentional interference. First, a scenario where the radar system is under the electronic attack of noise-like interferers is considered. In this context, two sets of training samples are jointly exploited to devise a novel two-step estimation procedure of the interference covariance matrix.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decades, radar art has been significantly influenced by the advances in technology as corroborated by the last-generation processing boards capable of performing huge amounts of computations in a very short time while keeping the costs relatively low. This abundance of computation power has allowed for the development of radar systems endowed with more and more sophisticated processing schemes.
To provide a tangible example, let us focus on search radars which are primarily concerned with the detection and tracking of targets embedded in thermal noise, clutter, and, possibly, intentional interference, also known as Electronic Countermeasure (ECM) [1] - [4] . In this context, the open literature is rich with novel contributions on adaptive detection with the result that detection architectures are evolving towards a continuous performance enhancement. Consider, for example, the space-time detection algorithms that exploit large volumes of data from sensor arrays and/or pulse trains to take advantage of temporal and spatial integration/diversity [5] - [14] . Another route followed by the radar community to improve the detection performance consists in using the available information about the structure of the Interference Covariance Matrix (ICM) at the design stage. As a matter of fact, special structures of the ICM are induced by the system and/or interference properties [15] - [25] . As an illustration of this fact, consider those decision rules devised assuming that the ICM is centrohermitian. These algorithms allow us to reduce the number of training samples required in the ICM estimation [15] - [22] , [26] - [28] by almost a half while maintaining a satisfactory detection performance. Further examples are provided in [23] , [24] , where it is shown that the spectral symmetry of the clutter can be used for instance to obtain gains of about 3 dB (in SINR, namely Signal-to-Noise plus Interference Ratio), for a Probability of Detection P d = 0.9 and Probability of False Alarm P f a = 10 −4 , in comparison to conventional detectors.
In most of the above contributions, the ICM results from the superposition of two components representative of the following two interference sources • the electronic devices generating thermal noise, which is ubiquitous;
• the specific operating environment, whose backscattering gives rise to the clutter component. However, radars might be potential targets of electronic attacks by an adversary force, which can use, for instance, active techniques aimed at protecting a platform from being detected and tracked by the radar [4] . This is accomplished through two approaches: masking and deception. Noncoherent Jammers or Noise-Like Jammers (NLJs) attempt to mask targets generating nondeceptive interference which blends into the thermal noise of the radar receiver. As a consequence, the radar sensitivity is degraded due to the increase of the constant false alarm rate threshold which adapts to the higher level of noise [2] , [4] .
In addition, this increase makes more difficult to discover that jamming is taking place [3] , [29] .
On the other hand, the Coherent Jammers (CJs) transmit low-duty cycle signals intended to inject false information into the radar processor. Specifically, they are capable of receiving, modifying, amplifying, and retransmitting the radar's own signal to create false targets maintaining radar's range, Doppler, and angle far away from the true position of the platform under protection [2] , [4] , [29] , [30] .
Against the aforementioned electronic attacks, radar designers have developed defense strategies referred to as Electronic Counter-CounterMeasure (ECCM) which can be categorized as antenna-related, transmitter-related, receiver-related, and signal-processing-related depending on the main radar subsystem where they take place [29] . The first line of defense against jamming is represented by the radar antenna, whose beampattern can be suitably exploited and/or shaped to eliminate sidelobe false targets or to attenuate the power of NLJs entering from the antenna sidelobes. The Sidelobe Blanker (SLB) is an ECCM technique against pulsed interferences [31] - [33] which compares the detected signal amplitude from the main channel with that of an auxiliary channel. Specifically, when the auxiliary channel signal power is greater than that from the main channel, it is likely that the radar is under attack of a CJ from the sidelobes and, hence, the detection is blanked. In the presence of continuous or high duty cycle interferers, the SLB becomes ineffective since it would inhibit the detection of true targets for most of the time. In these situations, the Sidelobe Canceler (SLC) represents a viable ECCM against NLJs [2] , [34] , [35] . It places nulls in the sidelobes of the main receiver beam along the directions of arrival of the NLJs which are adaptively estimated using auxiliary channels. Both the SLB and SLC can be jointly used to face with NLJs and CJs contemporaneously impinging on the sidelobes of the victim radar [36] . Finally, it is important to mention that modern radars employ a digitally based approach to implement the SLC function. Specifically, digital samples from each channel of an electronically scanned array are weighted to adaptively shape the resulting beampattern. These techniques belong to the more general family of algorithms called Adaptive Digital Beamforming [4] , which can be classified as signal-processing-related ECCM.
In this paper, we devise adaptive detection architectures with signal-processing-related ECCM capabilities against the attack of NLJs and/or CJs from the antenna sidelobes. At the design stage, we focus on two operating scenarios which differ for the presence of an unknown number of CJs. More precisely, in the first scenario, the target echoes compete against thermal noise, clutter, and NLJs whose number is unknown, whereas the second scenario also includes prospective CJs. Both detection problems are formulated in terms of binary hypothesis tests and, following the lead of [37] , two independent sets of secondary data are assumed available for estimation purposes.
The first set comes from the conventional radar reference window surrounding the CUT and shares the same ICM components as the CUT including the clutter component. The other training set is acquired before the transmission of the pulse waveform (spatial processing) with the consequence that these data do not contain clutter components. However, unlike [37] , in this paper, we propose a novel two-step procedure to estimate the ICM components in a more effective way. Specifically, the thermal noise and NLJ components are estimated using the second data set 1 (first step). The latter estimate replaces the corresponding ICM components of the conventional data set, which is used to estimate the remaining unknown ICM component, namely, the clutter component (second step). The number of NLJs impinging on the victim radar is unknown and, hence, is estimated resorting to either the so-called Model Order Selection (MOS) rules [38] , which provide more reliable results than the Maximum Likelihood Approach (MLA) in the presence of nested hypothesis, or a heuristic procedure based on the MLA. More important, the herein proposed ICM estimation procedure requires a less restrictive constraint on the required volume of data with respect to that presented in [37] (a point better explained in Section III-A). Finally, the detection problem in the presence of NLJs is solved by applying the two-step Generalized Likelihood Ratio Test (GLRT) design procedure [6] where the ICM of the CUT is replaced by the new estimate.
The final result consists in a multiple-stage architecture capable of taking advantage of the information carried by the additional training data set.
The other considered detection problem also includes the presence of CJs. Under the latter assumption, we leverage the sparse nature of data under the alternative hypothesis to exploit compressive sensing reconstruction algorithms as the Sparse Learning via Iterative Minimization (SLIM) [39] . More precisely, we compute the Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT) where the ICM is replaced by the previously derived estimate, while target response and CJ amplitudes are estimated by the SLIM. The exploitation of SLIM (or, generally speaking, compressed sensing algorithms) is due to the fact that, as a byproduct, it allows for echo classification and estimation of both angles of arrival (AOA) and number of the interfering sources. In fact, if the LRT statistic is over the detection threshold, the following situations may occur:
• only CJs are present (target response is zero while CJ amplitudes are nonzero);
• only the target is present (target response is nonzero while CJ amplitudes are zero);
• simultaneous presence of the target and CJs (target response and CJ amplitudes are nonzero).
With these remarks in mind, we use the estimates provided by SLIM to build up a decision logic capable of discriminating among the above conditions which, evidently, form a multiple hypothesis test.
Remarkably, this approach can be used in place of the conventional SLB since it recognizes possible CJs echoes which can be concurrent with target echoes without blanking the detection. Thus, the proposed detection architecture features SLB/SLC functionalities overcoming the limitations of the SLB.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II is devoted to problem formulation and definition of quantities used in the next derivations while the design of the detection architectures and estimation procedures are contained in Section III. In Section IV, the behavior of the proposed architectures is investigated by means of numerical examples. Finally, some concluding remarks and future research tracks are given in Section V. Some derivations are confined in the appendices.
Notation
Vectors and matrices are denoted by boldface lower-case and upper-case letters, respectively. Symbols det(·) and tr (·) denote the determinant and the trace of a square matrix, respectively. Symbols I and 0 represent the identity matrix and the null vector or matrix of suitable dimensions, respectively. The imaginary unit is denoted by j. Given a vector a, diag (a) indicates the diagonal matrix whose ith diagonal element is the ith entry of a. For a finite set A, |A| stands for its cardinality. As to the numerical sets, R is the set of real numbers, R N ×M is the set of (N × M )-dimensional real matrices (or vectors if M = 1), C is the set of complex numbers, and C N ×M is the set of (N × M )-dimensional complex matrices (or vectors if M = 1). The (k, l)-entry (or l-entry) of a generic matrix A (or vector a) is denoted by A(k, l) (or a(l)). We use (·) T and (·) † to denote transpose and conjugate transpose, respectively. The the Clutter-to-Noise Ratio and the Jammer-to-Noise Ratio are denoted by CNR and JNR, respectively. The conditional probability of an event A given the even B is represented as P (A|B). 
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a radar system which exploits N spatial (identical) channels to sense the surrounding environment. The incoming signal is conditioned by means of a baseband down-conversion and a filtering matched to the transmitted pulse waveform 2 . Next, the output of the matched filter is suitably sampled and the samples are organized into N -dimensional complex vectors representing the range bins [1] , [13] .
In what follows, we denote the vector of the returns from the CUT by z ∈ C N ×1 , while the conventional training set, formed by collecting the returns from the range bins surrounding the CUT [1] , [5] , is stored in the matrix Z = [z 1 , . . . , z K ] ∈ C N ×K . Finally, we assume also that the system acquires an additional set of training vectors by listening to the environment (namely, operating in passive mode) [37] . This second set is denoted by R = [r 1 , . . . , r M ] ∈ C N ×M .
As stated in Section I, in this paper we focus our attention on two different detection problems which are representative of two scenarios differing for the presence of a CJ in the CUT. Specifically, the first problem, which is the same as in [37] , can be formulated as
where • n, n 1 , . . . , n K , m 1 , . . . , m M are statistically independent random vectors distributed as follows:
[n, n 1 , . . . , n K ] ∼ CN N (0, M 1 , I) and [m 1 , . . . , m M ] ∼ CN N (0, M 2 , I);
• α T is a complex factor representative of the target response and channel effects; Unlike [37] , we assume that the ICMs exhibit specific structures, namely M 1 = σ 2 I + M nj + M c and
the resulting power, M c is representative of the clutter, and M nj is the contribution raising from the presence of NLJs and can be expressed as
nj,i , and θ nj,i being the number of NLJs, the power, and the AOA of the ith NLJ, respectively. An important remark on the relationship between the rank of M nj and N nj is required for further developments. Precisely, note that when the NLJs are angularly very close each other, then the resulting steering vectors almost entirely lay along a given direction in the N -dimensional vector space and, as a consequence, exhibit a negligible component along the orthogonal direction. Thus, due to the finite precision of the radar processing units and to the structure of the steering vector subspace, the dimension of the subspace spanned by closely spaced steering vectors is less than or equal to the number of the considered steering vectors. It follows that the rank of M nj , namely the maximum number of linearly independent columns, is less than or equal to N nj .
The second scenario accounts for the joint presence of NLJs and CJs in the CUT. This seemingly minor modification leads to a more general and difficult problem, which encompasses the former and can be written as
where β i and θ q,i are the magnitude and the AOA of the ith CJ, respectively, N q is the number of CJs attacking the radar, while the assumptions on n, n k , and m m keep unaltered. It is clear that problem
For future reference, it is worth providing the following definitions. Specifically, the probability density functions (pdfs) of Z and R under all the hypotheses are 3
respectively. On the other hand, the pdf of z under H l,h , (l, h) ∈ {(0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 1)}, exhibits the following expression
where β = [β 1 , . . . , β Nq ] T and θ q = [θ q,1 , . . . , θ q,Nq ] T . Finally, let us denote the likelihood func-tions of the distribution parameters as
III. DETECTION ARCHITECTURE DESIGNS
In this section, we devise adaptive decision schemes capable of operating under the attack of NLJs and/or CJs. In detail, we first focus on problem (1) where only NLJs are contaminating data and, then, we account for the presence of possible coherent interferers in addition to NLJs.
A. NLJ-only Attack
The design is structured into two parts. In the first part, we assume that the rank of M nj , which is representative of the effective interfering sources number, is known. Then, in the second part, we exploit previous results to conceive multi-stage architectures facing with the situations where only the maximum number of NLJs is known. To this end, we resort to the MOS rules which represent an effective means to provide reliable estimates of the number of NLJ.
Let us focus on problem (1) and suppose that the rank of M nj , r say, is known 4 . Unlike [37] , the herein proposed estimation procedure exploits all the available structure information about M 1 and M 2 and is developed according to the following rationale 1) use R (the additional training set) to find the maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) of M 2 , denoted by
where σ 2 and M nj are the MLEs of σ 2 and M nj , respectively;
2) compute the MLE of M c based on Z assuming that M 2 is known, namely
3) replace M 2 in (6) with M 2 .
As for the first step, in Appendix A, we show that the expression of M 2 is
... ≥ γ 1,N > 0 the eigenvalues of RR † and U S1 ∈ C N ×N a unitary matrix containing the corresponding
The estimator of M c described in the second step of the procedure is a function of M 2 which is assumed known. Thus, the resulting likelihood function depends on M c only and can be recast as
In Appendix B, we prove that the MLE of M c for known M 2 is given by
In the last equation,
and U S2 ∈ C N ×N is the unitary matrix of the corresponding eigenvectors.
As final step of the estimation procedure, we replace M 2 with M 2 and compute
It is important to observe that this new estimation procedure (schematically summarized in Algorithm 1)
requires that M > r to ensure that M 2 is invertible with probability 1, instead of M > N > r.
Now, we focus on the case where r is unknown and should be somehow estimated from data. To this end, two different strategies are conceived.
The first strategy relies on a three-stage detection architecture where the first two stages are devoted to the estimation of M 1 and incorporate the MOS rules [38] . More precisely, the first stage provides an estimate of r and feeds the second stage which is responsible for the estimation of M 2 and M 1 according to Algorithm 1. The third stage accomplishes the detection task.
The second approach consists in a modification of the maximum likelihood estimation of M 2 which accounts for the significant hop in the order of magnitude of the eigenvalues of RR † when NLJs are present (a point better explained in Subsection III-A2). This discontinuity can be justified by noticing that common JNR values are in the range 5 [30, 60] dB [40] . It follows that r can be estimated by detecting this hop in magnitude.
1) MOS-based Three-stage Detection Architectures:
A block scheme of the proposed architectures is depicted in Figure 1 : the first two blocks perform the estimate of M 1 exploiting the MOS rules for selecting r. The last block represents the final detection step. Here, it is important to note that to estimate r the MLA fails because the hypotheses are nested and the likelihood function monotonically increases with r. Thus, focusing on the first block, the estimation of r is accomplished exploiting the MOS rules which balance the growth of the likelihood function by means of a penalty term. Specifically, we consider the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), and the Generalized Information Criterion (GIC) [38] . 
where N max nj is the maximum number of jammers and
is 6 the compressed log-likelihood of R assuming that r is known and p(r) = k p (r)ν is the penalty term.
Finally, factor ν takes on the following values
Once the estimater is available, it can be used in place of r in Appendix A to estimate M 2 . The resulting estimate of M 2 is, subsequently, used to obtain M 1 as shown in Appendix B.
The last block of the proposed architecture implements an adaptive decision rule, devised resorting to the two-step GLRT design criteria [6] . Specifically, we first compute the GLRT test assuming that M 1 is known. Then, the fully adaptive detector is obtained by replacing M 1 with a suitable estimate.
According to the first step, the GLRT based on the CUT for known M 1 is the following decision rule
where f l0 (z; . . .), l = 0, 1, is defined by (4) and η is the detection threshold 7 value to be set according to the desired P f a . It is not difficult to prove that (15) is statistically equivalent to
Finally, the adaptivity is achieved replacing M 1 in (16) with the estimate (10) to come up with
For future reference, we refer to the above decision rule as Improved Double-Trained Adaptive Matched
Filter (IDT-AMF), whereas we call the three-stage architectures coupling the name of the MOS rule used to estimate r and the acronym IDT-AMF. For instance, when BIC is part of the architecture, we refer to 6 Note that in the case where r = 0, the term M r i=1 log γ 1,i M does not appear and, in addition, whenr = 0, the procedure returns
the latter as IDT-AMF-BIC. where η is a threshold whose value reflects the difference in magnitude between the eigenvalues associated with NLJs and thermal noise and those representative of the thermal noise only. Finally, once r has been estimated, M 2 can be obtained as described in Appendix A and the IDT-AMF is applied. In the following, we call this architecture Eigenvalue-based IDT-AMF and we use the abbreviation IDT-AMF-EIG. 
2) Two-Stage

B. NLJs and Coherent Interferers Joint Attack
In this subsection, we focus on problem (2) and devise an architecture capable of detecting point-like targets assuming that noise-like jammers as well as coherent interferers contaminate the echoes from the CUT. Specifically, such architecture consists of a covariance estimation stage, which relies on the results obtained in Section III-A1, followed by a new detection stage based upon the so-called SLIM algorithm proposed in [39] .
Let us consider the hypothesis H 1,1 , defined in (2), where it is assumed that a number of coherent interferers (N q ) are present together with the NLJs and note that z is the sum of three components
To effectively apply the SLIM approach, it is necessary to bring to light the sparse nature of (18) 
where α is assumed to contain the target response α T as well as the magnitudes of the coherent jammers {β} Nq i=1 . It is important to observe that since N q ≪ L, then α is a sparse vector. In fact, from (19) , it turns out that only N q + 1 components of α are possibly different from zero. In this case, the SLIM algorithm can be used to produce a very accurate representation for the scene of interest. Remarkably, we can exploit the sparse estimate returned by the SLIM to address the following classification problem • target plus noise-like interferers hypothesis:
• noise-like plus coherent interferers hypothesis:
• target plus noise-like and coherent interferers hypothesis:
Thus, as shown in what follows, the newly proposed architecture exhibits, as a byproduct, signal classification capabilities. Let us start the design by writing the LRT based upon the CUT
where f l (z; lα, M 1 , H l,l ) is the pdf of z under H l,l , l = 0, 1, whose expression is
Now, note that decision rule (23) is not of practical interest since both α and M 1 are not known and, hence, must be estimated from data. As already stated at the beginning of this subsection, the estimate of M 1 can be accomplished using the procedures described in Algorithm 1. As for α, it is estimated resorting to the framework proposed in [39] . Specifically, let us assume that α is a random vector independent of the noise component and that obeys a prior promoting the sparsity, given by
where C is a normalization constant and q ∈ Ω q = (0, 1] is a tuning parameter (smaller values of q correspond to sharper peak of the prior distribution and consequently sparser estimate of α). Then, α is estimated solving the following maximization problem
where f 1 (z; M 1 , H 1,1 |α) is the conditional pdf of z given α. Taking the negative logarithm, problem
where A = M z. Notice that the first addendum of g q (α) corresponds to a fitting term, whereas the second term promotes sparsity. Setting to zero the first derivative 9 of g q (α) with respect to α leads to
where
Supposing that an initial estimate of α is available, it is possible to apply a cyclic optimization procedure as in [39] , and the step at the (m)th iteration can be expressed as
given P
) from the (m − 1)th iteration. The optimization procedure can terminate after a fixed number of iterations or when the following convergence criterion is satisfied
with ∆ a suitable small positive number. As for the initial value of α, a possible choice is
It still remains to estimate q ∈ Ω q . As a preliminary step, we sample Ω q to come up with a finite set of admissible values for q denoted byΩ q . Now, given q ∈Ω q , letα q be the estimate of α provided by the above iterative procedure, summarized in Algorithm 3, and estimate the number of peaks, h(q) say, iñ α q as follows 1) sort the entries ofα q from the largest to the smallest;
2) select h(q) returning the lowest value of BIC q = 2 y − A α q 2 2 + 3h(q) log (2N ), where 3h(q) is the number of parameters to be estimated (namely, azimuth and complex amplitude for each active peaks) and α q is the least-squares estimate for the selected peaks setting to zero the other entries of α (denote byᾱ q the final estimate of α q ).
As a result, we obtain the set {BIC q : q ∈Ω q } and the estimate of q is obtained as q = arg min q∈Ωq BIC q .
Finally, the adaptive LRT can be written as 9 We make use of the following definition for the derivative of a real function f (α) with respect to the complex argument α = αr + jαi, αr, αi ∈ R, [41] ∂f (α) ∂α = 1 2
Algorithm 3 Sparse Learning Iterative Minimization (SLIM)
Input: ∆ > 0, q ∈ (0, 1], A, y Output:α q 1: Set m = 0,
Before concluding this section, we discuss the classification capabilities raising fromᾱq. Specifically, let us recall that H 1,1 can be viewed as the union of three hypotheses, namely H 1,1 = 3 i=1 H i and partition the set Θ into N q subsets, Θ i say, containing contiguous AOAs. Note that the ith subset identifies the directions v(θ n ), ∀θ n ∈ Θ i . Now, we declare that Θ i contains coherent signal components if there exists an index n such that α(n) = 0 and θ n ∈ Ω i . Thus, if we denote by Θ T the subset containing θ T , Ω α , with |Ω α | ≥ 1, the set of integers indexing the nonzero entries ofᾱq, then we can reason as follows • if Ω α = {ω} and the θω belongs to Θ T , then H 1 is declared, otherwise H 2 holds true;
• if |Ω α | > 1 and there existsω ∈ Ω α such that θω ∈ Θ T , then H 3 is declared, otherwise H 2 is valid.
Thus, the SLIM-based detector (33) can be incorporated into the architecture depicted in Figure 3 , where the condition onω is : ∃ω ∈ Ω α : θω ∈ Θ T . It is important to highlight that such architecture can absolve the functions of both SLB and SLC [2] . In fact, the use of M 1 allows to place nulls along the NLJ directions, whileᾱq allows to separate the target response from the coherent interferers.
Summarizing, the proposed approach allows to suitably handle situations where NLJs as well as CJs attack the victim radar providing a tool for the discrimination between useful structured returns and unwanted signals. In fact, focusing on the CUT only, the actual classification problem herein addressed is the following multiple-hypothesis test
H 00 : z = n. The SINR is defined as SINR = |α| 2 v(0) † M −1 1 v(0), while the considered scenario comprises three NLJs with the same power from the following AOAs: θ nj,1 = 15 • , θ nj,2 = 25 • , and θ nj,3 = −10 • . Then, the resulting ICMs are given by
The (i, j)th entry of M c is given by M c (i, j) = ρ |i−j| , where ρ = 0.9 is the one-lag correlation coefficient.
Finally, the maximum number of NLJs is set to N/2 and the GIC parameter, ρ say, is equal to 2 (this choice represents a reasonable compromise to limit the model overestimation).
In Figure 4 , the P d versus SINR for all the considered detectors is plotted assuming K = M = 20, JNR = 30 dB and CNR = 20 dB. As it can be seen, the IDT-AMF-BIC, IDT-AMF-GIC and IDT-AMF-EIG have nearly the same performance as the IDT-AMF with known r and they exhibit higher P d values than the DT-AMF with a gain of 0.6 dB at P d = 0.9. The IDT-AMF-BIC, IDT-AMF-GIC, IDT-AMF-EIG and IDT-AMF exhibit similar performances due to the fact that the stages responsible for the estimate of r share the same estimation accuracy. As to the IDT-AMF-AIC, it experiences a loss about 1.0 dB at P d = 0.8 with respect to other proposed detectors but still has slightly higher P d than the DT-AMF in the low/medium SINR region. However, the IDT-AMF-AIC is not capable of achieving P d = 1.0 for higher SINR values at least for the considered parameter values.
To show the influence of K and M on the detection performance of the proposed detectors, in Figure   5 we set K = 14 leaving the other parameters as in Figure 4 , whereas the parameter values in Figure 6 are the same as in Figure 4 but for M = 13. Inspection of Figure 5 confirms the trend observed in Figure   4 . Moreover, the performance gain of the proposed detectors with respect to the DT-AMF increases as K decreases. Precisely, the DT-AMF experiences a loss of about 8.5 dB at P d = 0.9 with respect to the architectures based upon BIC, GIC, and the modified ML estimation. Even though the IDT-AMF-AIC performs better than the DT-AMF for SINR< 26 dB, it is still not capable of ensuring P d = 1. Comparing Figure 5 with Figure 4 , we can note that each proposed detector experiences a loss of about 1 dB when K decreases from 20 to 14. This is due to the fact that the estimation quality of r and M 1 reduces. On the other hand, Figure 6 highlights that, when M = 13 and K = 20, the IDT-AMF-GIC and IDT-AMF-EIG overcome the IDT-AMF-BIC with a gain of 0.4 dB at P d = 0.9, whereas the IDT-AMF-AIC has a severe performance degradation. It is important to stress that the P d curve of DT-AMF is not reported in Figure   6 
B. SLIM-based detector performance analysis (NLJs and CJs joint attack)
In this subsection, we investigate the behavior of the SLIM-based detector in a scenario which assumes the joint presence of one NLJ and two CJs (N q = 2). It is important to note that CJs can be also categorized as targets, since they emulate echoes from an object of interest. For this reason, the considered performance metrics concern the capability of the system to detect both target and CJs and to discriminate between the echoes backscattered from the target and the echo-like signal transmitted by the CJs. The NLJ illuminates the radar with a JNR of 30 dB and AOA θ nj = 10 • , whereas the CJs are located at θ q,1 = −14 • and θ q,2 = 16 • and radiate power at the same JNR of 45 dB. Target signature is given by v(0) and the SINR is defined as in the previous subsection. In other words, the operating scenario corresponds to H 3 . As for the ICMs, M 2 = I + JNRv(θ nj )v(θ nj ) † , whereas M 1 is defined using the same parameters as in the previous subsection.
The analysis, conducted by means of Monte Carlo simulation, is aimed at estimating the following main performance metrics:
• the probability of detection (P d ) defined as the probability to declare H 1,1 when the latter holds true for a preassigned value of the P f a , defined as the probability to declare H 1,1 when H 0,0 is in force;
• the probability of declaring the presence of a target under H 3 , which is denoted by P t|H3 ;
• the probabilities of correct classification, namely the probability of declaring H i , i = 1, 2, 3, when it is on force.
Finally, to assess the estimation capabilities of the SLIM-based detector, additional figure of merits will be suitably introduced in the second part of this section. All the mentioned metrics are estimated resorting In Figure 8 , we show the P d and the P t|H3 both as functions of the SINR and for (K, M ) ∈ { (16, 16) , (32, 32) }. As expected, the P d is equal to 1 regardless the values of K, M , and SINR. This is due to the presence of the CJs whose JNR is constant and equal to 45 dB. On the other hand, the P t|H3 achieves 1 at SINR= 15 dB when (K, M ) = (32, 32) and at SINR= 17 dB when (K, M ) = (16, 16) .
Generally speaking, inspection of the figure highlights that increasing the volume of training samples leads to a moderate improvement of the P t|H3 .
It is important to highlight that the SLIM-based detector draws, as a byproduct, a picture of the electromagnetic scenario under surveillance in terms of AOAs of possible passive or active objects.
However, this picture might contain false objects (ghosts) or ignore existing sources. Thus, it is worth to evaluate to what extent the above phenomena take place. To this end, in Figure 9 , we plot the following figures of merit as functions of the SINR • Root Mean Square (RMS) number of missed interferers, n mj say, evaluated by verifying that the Θ i s corresponding to the two jammers refer to null entries ofᾱq;
• RMS number of ghosts, n g say, defined as the nonzero components ofᾱq in positions different from that of the target and CJs;
• the Hausdorff metric [42] between α andᾱq. This metric belongs to the family of the multiobject distances which are able to capture the error between two sets of vectors and is defined as Note that the Hausdorff metric decreases as the SINR increases up to 15 dB and then it takes on a constant value equal to n g = 0.4. Remarkably, the RMS number of missed jammers is close to zero regardless of the SINR, since it depends on the JNR. Finally, Figure 10 contains the classification histograms assuming SINR= 20 dB. More precisely, each subplot presents the probabilities P (H i |H k ) as the percentages of declaring H i , i = 1, 2, 3, when H k , k = 1, 2, 3, is in force. The histograms highlight that the probability of correct classification, namely of deciding for H i when the latter holds, is close to 1 at least for the considered parameter setting.
Summarizing, the analysis shows that the SLIM-based detector is very versatile, since it can operates in the presence of NLJ and/or CJs. More important, it can ensure excellent signal classification performances allowing for the discrimination between the echoes backscattered from a target and coherent signals emitted by hostile platforms.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have devised adaptive detection architectures with signal-processing-related ECCM capabilities against the attack of NLJs and/or CJs from the antenna sidelobes. We have analyzed two operating scenarios which differ for the presence of an unknown number of CJs assuming that two independent sets of training samples are available for estimation purposes. Next, we have devised novel signal processing procedures to estimate the ICM capable of providing reliable estimates even in the presence of a low volume of secondary data. Moreover, such estimation procedures work without knowing the actual number of NLJs. In the case where CJs are present, we have conceived a multistage architecture which leverages the hidden sparse nature of the data model to detect structured signals backscattered from a target or generated by CJs. To this end, we have borrowed the SLIM paradigm proposed in [39] . The performance analyses has highlighted that the newly proposed detection architectures exhibit satisfactory performances and, more important, the SLIM-based detector with its classification capabilities can act as an improved SLB, since, in the case where a target and CJs are simultaneously present, it does not blank the possible detection. In this Appendix, we provide the derivation of (7) . To this end, compute the logarithm of L R (σ 2 , M nj ) and recast it by means of the eigendecompositions of M 2 and RR † as
where • Λ nj ∈ R N ×N is a diagonal matrix whose nonzero entries are the eigenvalues of M nj with λ nj,1 ≥ λ nj,2 ≥ ... ≥ λ nj,r > 0 and U ∈ C N ×N is the unitary matrix of the corresponding eigenvectors;
• Λ S1 ∈ R N ×N is a diagonal matrix whose nonzero entries are the eigenvalues of RR † , denoted by γ 1,1 ≥ γ 1,2 ≥ ... ≥ γ 1,N ≥ 0, and U S1 ∈ C N ×N contains the corresponding eigenvectors.
Thus, the maximization of ln L(σ 2 , M nj ) with respect to M 2 is equivalent to
Now, the optimization with respect to U can be accomplished exploiting Theorem 1 [43] , we obtain that
where W 1 = U † U S1 . It is possible to show that optimization with respect to W 1 leads to W 1 = Ie jθ1
for arbitrary θ 1 ∈ [0, 2π]. Thus, choosing for simplicity θ 1 = 0, an MLE of U can be recast as U = U S1 .
As a consequence, problem (36) becomes
To estimate the remaining parameters, let us set to zero the gradient of g(σ 2 , Λ j ). Then, the resulting estimates are given by
Finally, the MLE of M 2 is
Assume that M 2 is known and consider the following maximization problem
where L Z (M c ) is defined by (8) . To solve (42) 
where the last equality is due to the eigendecomposition of M 
The optimization with respect to V can be accomplished adopting the same line of reasoning as for W 1 in Appendix A, namely
where W 2 = V † U S2 and the last equality comes from the fact that W 2 = Ie jθ2 with θ 2 ∈ [0, 2π] arbitrary. As a result, an estimate of V is V = U S2 .
The final step consists in solving
max
whereḡ
Thus, setting to zero the gradient ofḡ(Ω c ), we obtain λ c,i = max γ 2,i K − 1, 0 , i = 1, . . . , N.
Gathering the above results, the MLE of M c for known M 2 is
where Ω c = diag λ c,1 , . . . , λ c,N . 
